INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a marked disruption in the dominant discourse on the 'information revolution' as ebullient pronouncements about the benefits of advances in information communication technologies (ICTs) have been matched by mushrooming concerns that the 'revolution' is proving to be a windfall for terrorists and criminals. Across the globe, governments and their law enforcement and national security agencies have increasingly expressed alarm that these technological advances have opened a floodgate of opportunity for an assortment of underworld figures to disguise, protect and expand their activities. For example, since the early 1990s government officials in many countries have claimed that the proliferation of encryption has jeopardized their long-standing practice of intercepting electronic communications, thereby permitting terrorists and criminals to operate with impunity in virtual refuges (EPIC and Privacy International 2004) . Along these lines, in early 2001, US officials alleged that Bin Laden and his associates were using encryption and steganography have benefited greatly from the anonymity afforded by pre-paid mobile phone cards (Balana and Avendao 2005; BBC 2002; Bouc 2005 , Gow 2005 Telecom Asia Daily 2005a , 2005c Van Buuren 2002 . In Canada, India and the US police and security agencies worry that Internet telephony or voice-over-internet protocol (VoIP) service is becoming a safe haven for activities that are inimical to public safety and national security (MacLeod 2004; Poulsen 2003; Reddy 2005) . And, for a decade or more, national law enforcement agencies and the G-7's Financial Action Task Force have argued that the high-speed electronic funds transfer networks under-girding the world's financial sector, provide money launderers and terrorist financiers with almost risk-free pipelines for moving and hiding vast amounts of illicit funds (for example, US OTA 1995) . There is mounting concern that these illicit actors are turning to Internet money transfer services such as 'e-cash' as well as 'offshore' Internet gambling sites to evade law enforcement (for example, FATF 2001: 6-7; Schepp 2001) .
In this discourse, the 'sinister underbelly' (Thachuk 2001 ) of the 'information revolution' is said to be flourishing apace. This development is portrayed as having the potential to devastate the political and social order unless new legal and technical measures provide law enforcement with updated network surveillance capacities. Suffused with a sense of imminent danger, this discourse has helped fuel an unprecedented worldwide surge of state network surveillance initiatives over the last decade or so. The following sketch maps key contours of this proliferation:
1. The US government's 'Clipper Chip' initiative was intended to prohibit forms of encryption that did not provide law enforcement agencies with a set of 'spare keys' they could use to 'unlock' encrypted messages. Efforts were made to persuade other governments to sign on to a global Clipper Chip plan. The initiative was shelved in 1999 in the face of intense opposition (Pednekar-Magal and Shields 2003) . 2. In various countries policy makers have mandated that telecom operators design current and future networks in a wiretap-friendly fashion. The US spearheaded the trend with the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 1994. The Act responded to concerns that new technologies were eroding the police's capacity to conduct wiretaps (Diffie and Landau 1998) . CALEA applies to all telecom operators except Internet service providers (ISPs). Recently, however, CALEA was extended to Internet phone services (McCullagh and Charny 2004) . The Netherlands' Telecommunications Act of 1998 forbids telecom operators and ISPs from selling services unless their networks support wiretaps (Macavinta 1998) . The UK's Regulatory Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 compels telecom operators and ISPs to work to maintain minimum levels of interception capability. The Canadian and New Zealand governments are considering CALEA-like legislation (Geist 2005; Olswang 2002 ).
3. Police and security agencies in India, Norway, Russia, the Ukraine and the US have deployed 'packet sniffer' technology to intercept Internet communication content and traffic data (for example, e-mail header information, web addresses accessed) (EPIC and Privacy International 2004: 53-55; Srivastava 2004 (Gomez 2004) . The Mumbai police have proposed regulations that would require customers to show photo identification and provide home address information (Badham 2004 ). 6. The US and the G-7's Financial Action Task Force (FATF) have led the effort to construct a 'global prohibition regime' on money laundering, particularly as facilitated by electronic funds transfer networks (also known as 'wire transfer' systems) (Shields 2005b) . One strategy has been to strip away the anonymity that has been traditionally associated with wire transfers. In 1995 the US mandated its banks and money transmitter services to record the identities of the originators of transfers. The US then worked with the FATF to quite successfully coax other countries to force their banks and money transmitter services to adopt US-style record-keeping rules (US OTA 1995: 115-17) . This effort was significantly stepped up in the wake of 9/11 (Shields 2005a) . And state officials in the UK called for a ban on anonymous wire transfers after the London bombings (Rennie 2005) .
These examples indicate that states in many parts of the world have moved aggressively to insert themselves in the control arrangements governing the design and institutionalization of electronic networks-invariably under the label of fighting crime and terrorism. This development, which has met with stiff resistance in many countries from human rights organizations and telecom-related businesses, is reinforcing the trend toward the construction of increasingly surveillance-intensive network architectures-a trend that is particularly evident in the West (Lessig 1999) . As a result, ground rules and taken-for-granted assumptions that condition communication and information exchange on electronic networks are changing in ominous ways. These are likely to have important implications for the kinds of communicative activity that may or may not occur on electronic networks, for example. Indeed, in many countries these changes may well reinforce already repressive state practices.
Given this state of affairs, it is curious that communication scholars have provided little or no critical assessment of these surveillance initiatives. The need for such enquiries is pressing since the initiatives involve augmenting the power of those who control state network surveillance systems without increasing their accountability. Moreover, there is no sign that the proliferation of initiatives is about to abate. Quite the contrary; recent history suggests that policy makers and law enforcement will continue to justify new kinds of network surveillance by pointing to a combination of factors-the roll-out of new ICTs and further terrorist attacks, for example. As in the past, these initiatives will be framed in terms of tough tradeoffs; more surveillance initiatives are essential to protect society, but we may have to accept that individual rights may be rolled back as a consequence. As Jack Straw, the UK's foreign secretary, recently put it when calling for a European-wide mandatory date retention regime: '[there needs to be a] rebalancing of where the line between the rights of individuals and rights of societies should lie' (Rennie 2005) . Such comments invite us to engage in debate over how to strike an appropriate balance. But the problem is that acceptance of this tradeoff language prematurely concedes and obscures a dangerous presumption-that state network surveillance does in fact curb crime and terrorism (Peissl 2003; Shields 2002) . Therefore, we must begin with the logically prior question: does enhancing network surveillance lead to the intended effect of reducing crime and terrorism?
Focusing on the US context primarily, this article seeks to address this question. The focus on one country follows from the reasonable assumption that the answer will depend, to a large extent, on contextual factors. The US context offers a particularly interesting case since, as indicated earlier, it has often taken the lead in state network surveillance measures and its lead has been followed to different degrees elsewhere (Escudero-Pascual and Hosein 2004; Hosein 2004) . The article makes a number of related arguments. First, I justify the claim that recent law enforcement-sponsored surveillance initiatives have enhanced state surveillance power. This requires a close reading of the technological characteristics of various network technologies and their relation to existing legal concepts (Hosein 2002; Whitley and Hosein 2005) . Second, it is argued that enhancing network surveillance power will not only fail to control the problems of crime and terrorism, but may well contribute to their escalation. In advancing this argument, I draw on, synthesize and extend work developed elsewhere (for example, Shields 2002 Shields , 2005a Shields , 2005b ). This argument is based on research that shows that under certain circumstances, state authorities pursue control strategies that produce ironic, or escalating, effects (for example, Andreas 2000; Marx 1980) . With respect to the network surveillance initiatives under review, it is suggested that these ironic effects can be traced to contradictions in the US government's approach to national security during the last two decades.
THE US STATES ENHANCED NETWORK SURVEILLANCE CAPACITY
Perhaps the most pervasive platitude in contemporary network policy discourse is the claim that advances in technology have outpaced and rendered anachronistic existing policy, law and other institutional practices. The clear implication is that this imbalance or disruption must be brought into line by updating or adapting existing policies, laws and practices, or by developing new ones. US law enforcement officials have elaborated a variant of this platitude to justify their network surveillance initiatives. Advances in technology are said to have raced ahead of law enforcement's ability to access the content of electronic communications and communications traffic data. If this is not rectified, the logic runs, criminals and/or terrorists will be provided a significant boon. This storyline is exemplified by former Attorney General John Ashcroft's (2001) Technology has dramatically outpaced our statutes. Law enforcement tools created decades ago were crafted for rotary phones-not e-mail, the Internet, mobile communications and voice mail. Every day that passes with outdated statutes and the old rules of engagement is a day that terrorists have a competitive advantage. Until Congress makes these changes [and enacts the Patriot Act], we are fighting an unnecessary uphill battle.
The same rationale was used to justify the aforementioned CALEA (Freeh 1993) , the Clipper Chip initiative (Reno 1999) and, more recently, the FBI's successful attempt to have CALEA extended to broadband service providers and Internet phone services:
Broadband telephony services, such as VoIP, are increasingly displacing traditional circuitmode telephony, and the extent of that shift becomes more pronounced on a seemingly daily basis.... In light of the explosive growth in [these services], it is clearer than ever that a failure to deem providers of broadband access services and broadband telephony services to be covered by CALEA would pose a serious risk that certain call content and call-identifying information would evade lawful electronic surveillance, thereby...jeopardizing the ability of [the government] to protect public safety and national security. (US Department of Justice 2004: 5-6) According to law enforcement officials, these initiatives bring the technology-policy imbalance back into equilibrium without augmenting their network surveillance power. For example, Louis Freeh (1995) , former director of the FBI, emphasized that CALEA 'neither expands authority nor ability, it merely maintains the status quo, that is, it only maintains the ability of law enforcement to conduct court-ordered electronic surveillance'. Former attorney general, Janet Reno (1999) , asserted that with the Clipper Chip initiative the Clinton administration was 'not looking to expand federal power or to increase our authority to wiretap.... We only look to make existing law apply to new technology.... [W] e seek only the way to maintain the original status quo' . Returning to John Ashcroft's (2001) comments on the USA Patriot Act, he claimed:
Our proposal creates a more efficient, technology-neutral standard for intelligence gathering, ensuring law enforcement's ability to trace the communications of terrorists over cell-phones, computer networks and new technologies that may be developed in the coming years.... We do not seek changes in the underlying protections in the law for the privacy of law-abiding citizens.... We are not asking the law to expand, just to grow as technology grows. This information has historically been available when criminals used pre-digital technologies.
Similarly, in making the case for CALEA coverage of Internet telephone services, the US Department of Justice (2004: 18) argued that the measure would not constitute a new power, but was merely asking for the full implementation of CALEA: 'CALEA's purpose is to preserve law enforcement's ability to conduct lawful electronic surveillance despite changing technologies. CALEA applies to all telecom carriers [including that provide broadband services and Internet telephony] and its application is technology neutral' .
The problem with this discourse is that words and phrases like 'preserve' , 'maintain' , 'status quo' and 'technology neutral' obscure the fact that these initiatives (at least those that have been implemented) have in fact enhanced state surveillance power (Hosein 2002) . The term 'technology neutral' refers to the increasingly pervasive practice of updating existing laws and applying them to contemporary electronic networks without discrimination.
2 As elaborated later, these updates disregard the technological particularities of different electronic networks, thus providing law enforcement with easier access to sensitive information.
In the traditional phone system, which was based on circuit switching, the content of communication (that is, the conversation) was completely separate from the data traffic about this communication (for example, time and date of call, length of call, location called from, location called). Unlike communication content, traffic data was stored by the telecom operator-usually for billing and network efficiency purposes. The law treated communication content and data traffic quite differently. Content was considered sensitive and therefore any law enforcement breach of confidentiality required a relatively high level of authorization (a court order based on a showing of probable cause), the actual act of accessing content was, in technical terms, relatively easy. By contrast, a lower level of authorization (no probable cause necessary) was required to access data traffic because it was viewed as less sensitive or 'nonprivate' (Schulhofer 2002: 39) .
As telecom operators deployed digital technology throughout the phone system, CALEA was enacted in response to law enforcement agencies' concerns that this technology was eroding their ability to access communication content and traffic data. One specific complaint was that these agencies had great difficulty accessing data traffic associated with mobile phones. Drawing on CALEA, these agencies pushed successfully to have mobile phone companies reengineer their networks in order to allow law enforcement with the capability to access the location of users at the beginning and end of their calls (Glave 1999) .
It can certainly be argued that this location information is a good deal more sensitive than the location of a fixed phone:
The location information of mobile communications can provide details of an individual's movements and activities and who they have met with. This location information may be combined with other transactional information such as websites visited using the mobile device, individuals called, search engine requests; all used to create a considerable profile. This affects a wide variety of human rights beyond the right of privacy including the right of free speech and assembly. (EPIC and Privacy International 2004: 57; see also Phillips 2005) Police can now access this more sensitive traffic data using the lower authorization standard referred to. This is a clear augmentation of state surveillance power.
Similar issues arise when considering the Internet, which is based on packet-switched technology. As alluded to earlier, the FBI developed the Carnivore to enable it to access Internet communication content as well as traffic data (Schulhofer 2002: 40) . Adopting a technologyneutral approach, the USA Patriot Act defines internet traffic data to include 'analogous' origin and destination identifiers for e-mail and web browsing, specifically 'routing, addressing and signaling information' . As Schulhofer (ibid.: 39) argues, this definition is very significant: 'Routing information for e-mail and web transmissions can reveal much more about subject matter and the identity of participants than a mere telephone number does. The identity of a website, for example, can be as content-specific as the title of books borrowed from a library or movies rented from a video store' . Again, under existing law, police can access this information under the less onerous authorization requirement.
The packet-switched nature of the Internet also gives rise to a further complication. Unlike the traditional phone system, communication content and communication traffic data are packaged together on the Internet. For example, the traffic data associated with an e-mail is the header that appears at the top of the content of the e-mail message. Consequently, a law enforcement request to access traffic data only (under the lesser authorization standard) may easily result in inadvertent or intentional interception of communication content. Moreover, the FBI claims that Carnivore is only used to monitor the communication content or traffic data of particular suspects. Indeed, they claimed that Carnivore can only function when its filter is highly selective; it does not have enough power to spy on everyone on a given ISP's network. In response to this claim, Schulhofer (ibid.: 42) provides the sobering example of an FBI agent who, in 2000, used Carnivore to conduct e-mail surveillance of a suspected Al-Qaeda operative but ended up recording not only the target's e-mail but that of many other network users. Reportedly, the FBI has begun to migrate from Carnivore to similar commercial products because the latter are less expensive and have an improved capacity to copy e-mails and other information of a targeted Internet account without affecting other subscribers (MSNBC News 2005).
To sum up, contemporary communication infrastructure is yielding different forms of transactional data, some of which are much more sensitive than traditional phone traffic data. Indeed, traffic data now blurs with the content of communications as new electronic networks are encompassed under existing legal practices. Escudero-Pascual and Hosein (2004: 82) provocatively argue:
Traffic data analysis generates more sensitive profiles of an individual's actions and intentions, arguably more so that communication content. In a communication with another individual, we say what we choose to share; in a transaction with another device, for example, search engines and cell stations, we are disclosing our actions, movements and intentions.
To some, a technology-neutral approach may seem to make sense since it attempts to ensure that new laws do no need to be enacted every time a new network technology comes along. However, when one goes beyond a surface reading, the approach clearly carries significant risks and costs. Most egregiously, the approach significantly enhances the state's network surveillance power under the guise of maintaining the status quo: 'New powers are granted through technological ambiguity rather than clear debate.... [This] problem will grow as more countries feel compelled to ratify and adopt these instruments; or feel it is in their interests to do so' (ibid.). But does this mean the way forward lies with producing network surveillance policies that are based on more technological awareness, greater stakeholder participation, and a keener appreciation of the need to protection individual rights? Before we can adequately address this question, we need to critically assess whether state network surveillance initiatives actually curb the problems of crime and terrorism.
THE IRONIES OF ENHANCED STATE NETWORK SURVEILLANCE
This assessment requires that we first understand the key dynamics driving the recent proliferation of state network surveillance initiatives. Law enforcement agencies and their allies provide a straightforward and seductive account of these dynamics. Janet Reno (1999) , former attorney general, explains:
Technology permits us wonderful new opportunities, but it can also be misused just as creatively to threaten public safety and national security.... Whether it benefits us or injures us depends almost entirely on the fingers on the keyboard. So while the Information Age holds great promise, it falls, in part, upon law enforcement to ensure that users of networks do not become victims of New Age crime.
In this account, the surge in network surveillance initiatives is rationalized as an unintended consequence of the development of new ICTs. There is nothing inherently evil about these technologies. Indeed, Reno taps into the utopian notion, particularly prevalent in the US, that technology has the potential to bring enhanced freedom, improvements in the quality of life, greater personal fulfilment and so forth (see Nye 1994; Winner 1997) . Rather, in Reno's account the evil lies with criminals and terrorists who wait on the periphery to use the technology so they can evade law enforcement more efficiently and commit crimes more easily. Law enforcement agencies must react to this state of affairs or public safety and national security will be in grave danger. As the roll-out of new network technologies and services accelerate, so too do the opportunities for malefactors to misuse them. State network surveillance initiatives must proliferate as a consequence. This is a 'discourse of inevitability' in which 'certain changes are made uncontestable due to their grounding in what is portrayed as the intrinsic nature and effects of technological progress' (Leonardi and Jackson 2004: 616) .
The emphasis in this discourse is on the potential loss of state control and its consequences, and on the technical changes that threatens this control. A solution to the problem is implied in the discourse; the state must regain control. Since the problem is viewed as a technological one (that is, law breakers' misuse of technology), many of the solutions are seen as lying in this terrain: attempting to ban various forms of encryption; requiring that telecom operators and broadband service providers re-engineer their networks to make them wiretap-complaint; developing and deploying Carnivore in order to monitor Internet communication; and working to design an enhanced monitoring capability into wire transfer systems. These policies are portrayed as closing the gap on and reasserting control over tech-savvy law breakers-at least until the next time advances in technology disrupt the technology-policy equilibrium alluded to in the previous section.
This perspective contains important truths. It would be hard to quarrel with the claim that particular criminals and terrorists take advantage of emerging ICTs, for example. Having said this, the problem with the account is that its technology-centrism propagates a misunderstanding of some of the key forces that have driven the various network surveillance initiatives. By characterizing the initiatives as simply the reactions of a benevolent state facing the unintended consequences of technology development, state policies are presented as innocent. This functions to mask the fact that the US state has contributed to some of the very problems that the various network surveillance initiatives are supposed to address. This is reinforced by the strong tendency in this account to portray all criminals and terrorists as purely external opportunistic forces that, like some mysterious virus, tend to have murky origins that can be traced to some distant shore. Again, this obscures the fact that some criminal and terrorist activities may be internal problems in the sense that contradictions in society shape their production (Standing 2003: 51) .
In the remainder of this section a different perspective is offered, one that is based on reversing the terms of a inquiry. Instead of placing technology at the centre of the analysis and treating the problems of crime and terrorism as a given, the account begins with the question of how these problems are constituted (Morley and Robins 1995: 72; Schlesinger 1987: 259) . It is within this broader enquiry that we can assess whether crime (in some of its forms) and terrorism can be curbed by enhancing state network surveillance. In brief, it is argued that the escalation of the US state's failed 'war on drugs' has been a key factor driving both law enforcement's network surveillance problems and the surge of network surveillance initiatives. Moreover, these initiatives have done little to deter the related practices of drug trafficking and money laundering, crimes that have been of major interest to US state officials in recent decades. Indeed, the proliferation of these initiatives appears to have contributed to the escalation of these practices. It is briefly argued that an analogous process may be occurring in the US state's war on terrorism.
The US War on Drugs
As the Cold War began to wind down, concerns about organized crime, particularly drug trafficking, emerged to dominate the US domestic and international security agendas (Andreas 1997) . The US state's approach to the problem has focused on prohibiting the supply of drugs to its citizens. The theory is that if law enforcement can restrict the growing, manufacturing, distribution and sale of illicit drugs, their prices will rise, and drug consumption will significantly decline (Bertram et al. 1996) . This supply-side approach binds law enforcers and law breakers in a highly interdependent relation (Andreas 1999) . For example, prohibiting drugs that are demanded by the public provides a major impetus for the emergence of drug trafficking organizations. Law enforcement also plays an important role in shaping drug-trafficking practices; more effective air interdiction efforts cause traffickers to rely more on commercial cargo shipping, for example. Moreover, as law enforcement intensify their supply-side approach, inefficient suppliers and distributors of illicit drugs are pushed out of business, replaced by others who are better organized and more sophisticated at evading law enforcement. And while there is ample evidence that the supply-side approach has failed miserably (for example, Bertram et al. 1996; MacCoun and Reuter 2001) , the policy response has been to escalate the approach by 'getting tougher' , by applying more resources to the problem.
This supply-side approach has conditioned the network practices of law enforcers and law breakers, it has helped impel the calls for more network surveillance initiatives and it has undercut the effectiveness of these initiatives. This set of claims is supported by examining wiretap and anti-money-laundering practices and policies.
Wiretapping
Since the US state stepped up its 'war on drugs' in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ability to wiretap has been repeatedly portrayed as a key supply-side tool (for example, Freeh 1993 Freeh , 1995 . A reading of the debates surrounding CALEA, the Clipper Chip and Carnivore shows that this 'war' was one of the most often cited justifications for the initiatives (McCullagh 2000) . Moreover, the preoccupation with the anti-drug offensive is reflected in the fact that since the early 1990s the vast majority of reported criminal (as opposed to national security) wiretaps have involved drug-related investigations.
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In addition to shaping law enforcement wiretap practices, the supply-side approach has influenced how drug traffickers have appropriated various network technologies that have been supplied by the 'information revolution' (Marshall 2001) . For example, in the early 1990s drug traffickers (and other criminals) reportedly migrated from traditional telephony to cellphones, pagers, encryption-enabled phones and computer communication to better coordinate supply and distribution activities, and to more efficiently evade law enforcement (Constantine 1997 ; see also Thomas 2004) . Why this migration? As a central plank of its supply-side approach, law enforcement began ratcheting up its wiretapping of suspects on the traditional telephone system. This provided drug traffickers with an incentive to move to technologies that were difficult to wiretap. Thus, they began to migrate to cellphones (Thomas 2004) . As law enforcement met this challenge with advances in interception technology and the enactment of CALEA, drug traffickers shifted to cloned cellphones to conduct their business, which allowed them to stay one step ahead of law enforcement. Similarly, CALEA's passage provided drug traffickers with an incentive to move to the Internet. This shift was then used by law enforcement as part of its justification for developing Carnivore.
Commenting on this cat-and-mouse dynamic, law enforcement officials simultaneously praised their progress (the passing of CALEA, its extension to mobile phones, the development of Carnivore) while pointing to the emergence of formidable new threats (the cloning of cellphones, the diffusion of the Internet), which in turn is used to justify calls for further network surveillance initiatives. The point to be made here is that it is not the deployment of new technologies that account for the cat-and-mouse games. Rather, it is the collision of the supply-side approach with the rise of new technologies that provides the explanation. The supply-side approach has provided drug traffickers with the incentive to evade law enforcement by shifting to new, more difficult to tap technologies. And as drug traffickers migrated to the new technologies this provides law enforcement with a rationale for more sophisticated interception and monitoring techniques. Of course, this ascending spiral of state surveillance initiatives has done little to deter the drug trafficking problem. The flow of illicit drugs flow continues unabated. Certainly, arrests and convictions have resulted from the information gleaned from the wiretaps that have been enabled by the new initiatives (ibid.). But these may have simply cleared the ground for rival drug traffickers to ply their trade.
Anti-money Laundering Practices
Money laundering was first defined as a law enforcement problem in the context of the supplyside approach. In the mid-1980s a consensus emerged among state officials that interdicting and confiscating laundered proceeds would play a key role in eliminating the supply of illicit drugs; seizing drug trafficker's assets, it was thought, would remove both the motive (profit) and the means (operating capital) to commit further crimes (Naylor 2002: 247) . Wire transfers were quickly identified as key conduits for laundering funds. By the end of the 1980s the American Bankers' Association Money Laundering Task Force (1989) claimed: 'Wire transfers, which are essentially unregulated, have emerged as the primary method by which high-volume launderers apply their trade' . The wire transfer system was attractive to launderers for at least two reasons. First, since enormous amount of transactions occur on these networks each day (700,000 transactions worldwide by 1995), illicit funds could be easily hidden. Second, at the time banks in the US and abroad rarely maintained wire transfer records (US OTA 1995).
The law enforcement response was to introduce surveillance at the information 'choke points' through which all wire transfers must flow. One set of choke points comprises the gateways to wire transfer systems (for example, banks and money transmitter services like Western Union). At this stage regulations require banks and other financial institutions to file a variety of reports (currency transaction reports on all deposits of US$ 10,000 or more; and suspicious activity report if employees suspect money laundering is occurring). Working through the G-7's Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the US government has pushed many countries to adopt their style of reporting requirements (Helleiner 1999) . Another set of choke points is distributed through the wire transfer systems themselves. As discussed earlier, all banks and money transmitter services in the US must record the identities of the originators of transfers. Again, throughout the 1990s, the US, working with the FATF, sought to internationalize these rules (Shields 2005b) .
As with the wiretapping example, the US state's supply-side approach to the drug trafficking problem has influenced how money launderers 4 have used network technologies. For example, the outlawing of money laundering in the mid-1980s provided drug traffickers with an incentive to use wire transfer networks for laundering profits. That is, as law enforcement efforts began a full-scale assault on traditional money laundering operations that involved smuggling illicit funds across borders, drug traffickers migrated to the recently deployed electronic transfer networks. At the time, these networks, which were rapidly diffusing throughout the world, were subject to very little regulation or law enforcement monitoring. As a result, electronic funds transfer networks emerged as the most common method of laundering money by the late 1980s. In response to this migration to electronic networks, policy makers enacted regulations throughout the 1990s (mandatory reporting requirements and wire transfer recordkeeping rules, for example). These regulatory initiatives triggered further escalation as the more sophisticated drug traffickers responded by rerouting some of their laundering activity in order to stay one step ahead of law enforcement. One strategy has been to develop new ways of smuggling cash across borders. Thus in the mid-1990s the FATF (1996: 5) detected an appreciable rise in the amount of illicit funds moving covertly across borders: 'Criminals have shown great sophistication in these operations, often purchasing businesses engaged in the shipment of goods and hiding dirty money inside the product'. Reportedly, a second more recent strategy has been to shift some laundering operations to Internet gambling sites. Given that many Internet gambling sites are located offshore, it is difficult for law enforcement to access the relevant records (Mueller 2002) . Predictably, state officials have called for the regulation of these sites (for example , Gest 2003; McCullagh 2001; Sloan 2000) .
We see a very similar pattern to the wiretapping example. An examination of the relevant policy discourse shows how law enforcement underscore their perceived successes (the implementation of various surveillance initiatives, and the arrests and convictions that derive from these) while alerting policy makers and the public to ominous developments (the use of wire transfers, the migration to Internet gambling sites). Again, these concerns are used to justify further surveillance-intensive regulations. And again, it is the law emforcer/law breaker dialectic that is propelling the escalation of surveillance initiatives. Despite widespread acknowledgement that no real dent has been made in the drug trafficking and money laundering problems, at no stage in this escalation have state officials questioned the efficacy of their surveillance-intensive measures.
The US War on Terror
Immediately after 9/11, the US state's 'war on terrorism' pushed its 'war on drugs' on to the back burner. As part of this shift, the Bush administration launched an intensive campaign to once more step up network surveillance in order to shore up domestic security. This embrace of surveillance occurred despite the fact that the US state's highly sophisticated pre-9/11 surveillance machine (including its network surveillance) failed to warn of the attacks. This breakdown in the security = surveillance equation is exemplified by the pivotal role played by wire transfers in the lead up to the attack. Overseas accomplices used wire transfer to provide the hijackers with the necessary financial means to plan and carry out their attacks in the US. Most of the transfers were less than US$ 10,000 (FATF 2004: 3) . These transfers slipped under the radar of the burgeoning surveillance capabilities that had been engineered into the world's financial system.
As in the 'war on drugs', this failure was only interpreted as evidence that more surveillance was necessary. Congress rushed to enact the aforementioned USA Patriot Act, which expanded both law enforcement's wiretapping and anti-money laundering surveillance powers. On the wiretapping front, the Act significantly reduced the checks and balances on law enforcement agencies by providing them with new ways of circumventing due process protection when applying for a wiretap, it lowered the threshold for the lawful use of Carnivore, and it greatly increased the budget for wiretapping. In the three years following the attacks, law enforcement wiretaps in national security (as opposed to criminal) investigations increased dramatically (Eggen and Schmidt 2004) . While state officials claim that the new wiretap tools, and a host of other powers, have foiled terrorist plots and resulted in hundreds of arrests and convictions, the evidence suggests something quite different. Most of these arrests and convictions have had little to do with terrorism (Eggen and Tate 2005) .
On the anti-money laundering front, the Patriot Act extends anti-money laundering regulations to the problem of terrorist financing. Businesses such as car dealers, pawnbrokers and foreign currency exchange services must now file the same kind of currency and suspicious activity reports filed by banks (Sloan 2003) . The legislation also provides substantial incentives to err on the side of maximum reporting since various institutions covered by the Act are held liable for failure to identify 'terrorist activities' . At the international level the FATF (2002: 2) has stepped up pressure on all countries to require banks and non-bank money transmitter services to 'include accurate and meaningful originator information...on [electronic] funds transfers and related messages that are sent out'.
These moves to bolster network-related surveillance in the wake of 9/11 may have been an effective way for the Bush administration to demonstrate its resolve and commitment to the public. They may have made many members of the public feel safer. However, it is not at all clear that they will curb terrorism. The role of network surveillance in the 'war on drugs' suggests that the post-9/11 initiatives may provide the foundation for more escalation of law enforcement surveillance as those who seek to attack Americans find alternative ways of communicating and moving funds. These alternatives may be provided by the 'information revolution' (for example, encrypted voice telephony, e-cash, smart cards) or by less technologyintensive networks (for example, hawalas-the informal money transfer networks). To the extent that there is a migration to these alternatives, there will be calls for more surveillance initiatives.
5 These initiatives will influence how terrorists communicate and finance their activities, but they are unlikely to reduce terrorism.
The persuasiveness of these conclusions depends on the reasonableness of extrapolating lessons from the 'war on drugs' to the 'war on terrorism' . They certainly have distinctive histories and dynamics. Yet they share an important similarity. As noted elsewhere (Shields 2005a) , state officials have justified both by drawing on language that draws overly sharp lines between state agencies on the one hand and 'criminals' and 'terrorists' on the other. This functions to gloss over the fact, mentioned earlier, that the problems of drug trafficking and terrorism are internal problems in the sense that contradictions in society shape their production. Certainly, the US state's supply-side approach to the war on drugs has provided the foundation for a highly interdependent and destructive relation between law enforcement and drug traffickers. Observers have persuasively made the case that US foreign policy has helped provide the foundation for an internecine relation between the US state on the one hand and actors that are intent on attacking Americans and their allies on the other (for example, Elias 2001; Johnson 2000 Johnson , 2003 . Some state actors accept this assessment. Johnson (2000: 9) quotes the Defense Science Board: 'Historical data shows a strong correlation between US involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States. In addition, the military asymmetry that denies nations the ability to engage in overt attacks against the United States drives the use of transnational actors '(that is, terrorists from one country attacking in another)' . More recently, the CIA chief warned that US actions in Iraq will fuel the terrorist threat to Americans (Priest and White 2005) .
CONCLUSION
This article began by mapping the worldwide surge of state network surveillance initiatives that has occurred over the last decade or so. Invariably, the rationales for these initiatives include the claim that they will curb crime and/or terrorism. Focusing on the US context, two interrelated points were made. First, contrary to law enforcement claims, the proliferation of state network surveillance initiatives has resulted in a substantial increase in state surveillance power. Dated legal concepts have been applied without discrimination to contemporary electronic networks. The upshot is that increasingly sensitive 'traffic data' can be accessed easily by law enforcement. Second, this enhanced network surveillance capacity has failed to deter drug trafficking and money laundering-intertwined crimes that have been of high priority to US state officials. In fact, not only have these initiatives failed to curb these crimes, they have contributed to their escalation. To the extent that individuals and particular groups have had their rights rolled back as consequence, this can be viewed as needless collateral damage in an ill-conceived 'war'. It is argued that a similar dynamic may be at work in the US state's 'war on terrorism'.
The problem is that state network surveillance initiatives in the US are chasing the symptoms of deeper problems (drug abuse and terrorism). As Peissl (2003: 24) suggests, if one accepts that surveillance 'may be the wrong drug for the necessary therapy, I cannot do anything else but conclude that one should better discontinue the drug' . Yet there appears little chance that the 'discontinuation' will occur in the near future. In the meantime, law enforcement agencies are augmenting their surveillance power by accessing increasingly sensitive information under minimal constraints, which permits them to more easily produce profiles of various individuals and groups of interest. This development must be challenged. Some scholars appear to suggest that different interception and monitoring policies should be developed for different communication infrastructures (for example , Hosein 2002; Whitley and Hosein 2005) . One would imagine that as these infrastructures evolve or new ones develop, these policies would need to be continually revised. An alternative approach would be to turn the technology-neutral approach on its head. In this scenario, law enforcement would be required to obtain the highest possible level of authorization (the standard applied to communication content) before accessing data traffic on any contemporary communication infrastructure. This nondiscriminatory policy is based on: (a) the fact that the line between communication content and communications data traffic will increasingly blur; and (b) individual rights should be maximized in the absence of any appreciable 'security dividend' resulting from enhanced state network surveillance power.
